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Abstract 
If humans are innately good, cooperative, fair, and averse to harming one another, why does 
widespread intergroup violence continue to afflict society? Several factors contribute to 
fomenting aggression between groups; here I focus on the role of pleasure in response to out-
group pain. 
 
 
Humans reliably divide their social world into us and them. This fundamental tendency is 
the source of humanity’s greatest triumphs but also its greatest tragedies. Banding together 
allows people to satisfy their own material and psychological needs (Allport,1954), and to 
develop norms and practices that bolster our most cherished social institutions (e.g., Keltner, 
2009; Tomasello, 2009). However, group living also results in violence and conflict between 
groups (Cohen & Inkso, 2008). According to one statistic, over 200 million people have been 
killed in acts of genocide, war, and other forms of group conflict in the last 100 years (Woolf & 
Hulsizer, 2004).  
It is difficult to reconcile these statistics on intergroup violence with the well-documented 
moral prohibitions against harm that guide most people’s behavior most of the time. In lab 
studies, people are willing to pay more to prevent harm to others relative to themselves 
(Crockett, Kurth-Nelson, Siegel, Dayan, & Dolan, 2014); they even exhibit physiological 
aversion responses when the harm they are causing isn’t real (e.g., shooting a person with a 
fake gun; Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012). These results are not unique to the lab 
setting or to harming innocent strangers. Analysis of combat activity during the Civil War and 
World War I reveal that soldiers would shoot over the heads of enemy combatants. Thus, harm 
aversion exerts its effects even in war (Grossman, 1996). So how do people eventually 
overcome their aversion to doing harm in order to participate in intergroup aggression? Several 
factors are critical for fomenting intergroup violence including moral disengagement, moral 
justification, and dissonance reduction (for an excellent review and theoretical integration, see 
Littman & Paluck, 2014). Here I focus on another complementary mechanism: pleasure in 
response to out-group pain. 
 
Key terms: Empathy, Schadenfreude, and Harm 
Empathy refers to the collection of affective and cognitive processes that allow people to 
recognize emotional experiences in others, experience matched sensations and emotions, and 
move to alleviate those others’ suffering (Batson, 2009). However, people do not empathize with 
all others all of the time (nor would it be adaptive if they did). Though it is not often 
conceptualized as an intergroup emotion, empathy is reliably moderated by group membership; 
people feel less empathy for out-group relative to in-group members. We refer to this difference 
as the intergroup empathy bias (Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011; Cikara, Bruneau, Van Bavel, & 
Saxe, 2014). People self-report this bias and exhibit decreased (and sometimes absent) 
physiological responses associated with empathy when witnessing out-group relative to in-
group members in physical or emotional pain (see Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014 for a recent 
review). This bias matters because the absence of empathy implies a reduction in motivation to 
help those in pain. 
What is left in the absence of empathy? Apathy: indifference towards out-group 
suffering. However it is important to note that while apathy may engender neglect, it should not 
promote active harm. An alternative to apathy is the opposite of empathy: pleasure in response 
to others’ misfortunes—Schadenfreude—or displeasure in response to others’ triumphs—
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Glückschmerz. In contrast to apathy, pleasure and pain are feasible motivators of overt 
intergroup aggression.  
Feeling pleasure in response to out-group misfortune is arguably a natural if not adaptive 
response in zero-sum environments: negative outcomes for “them” indicate positive outcomes 
for “us,” and are therefore pleasurable. However, experiencing Schadenfreude as a passive 
observer of out-group members’ pain is very different from being responsible for causing out-
group members’ pain. Here I propose that intergroup Schadenfreude is a natural response that 
supports the learning of an otherwise repugnant behavior: actively doing harm to others. If 
observing out-group members’ pain is consistently accompanied by feeling pleasure, people 
may learn over time to endorse and do harm to individual out-group targets.  
 
Relevant Debates 
In-group love versus out-group hate as motivators of intergroup aggression. Social 
categorization is fundamental for group living. It guides decisions about who to approach versus 
avoid and allows us to generalize our existing knowledge about social groups to novel targets 
(Bruner, 1957). Social categorization also requires that people categorize themselves (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). Shifting from an individual (“I” or “me”) to collective (“we” or “us”) self-concept is 
called social identification (Ellemers, 2012). Greater identification engenders greater in-group 
favoritism, which in turn reinforces the boundaries between “us” and “them” (Hewstone, Rubin, 
& Willis, 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; for review see). Indeed, in the absence of conflict, in-group 
love is a better predictor of inequitable resource allocation and intergroup bias that than out-
group hate is (Brewer, 1999). In-group love, however, is not sufficient to ignite intergroup 
conflict. This is why most out-groups elicit indifference rather than aggression. 
Instead, intergroup aggression is driven by competition over resources and 
incompatibility between groups’ goals: consider, for example, the violence against Jews in pre-
war Europe, or brawling among rival sports fans (Campbell, 1965; S. T. Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; 
Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Competition transforms 
indifference to emotions such as fear, hatred, and disgust (Cuddy, S. T. Fiske, & Glick, 2007; 
Mackie & Hamilton, 1993). These emotions are then used to justify overt discrimination against 
out-groups and their members (Brewer, 2000). Out-groups are dehumanized, or worse yet 
demonized, which places them beyond the boundary of justice that applies to the in-group (Bar-
Tal, 1989, Opotow, 2005; Staub, 2001).  
The Stereotype Content Model makes specific predictions about which social groups 
elicit apathy versus disgust versus threat (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). People harbor 
disgust for groups that are stereotyped as competitive (or exploitative) and low-status (e.g., drug 
addicts, welfare recipients), whereas people are threatened by groups that are stereotyped as 
competitive but high-status (e.g., wealthy professionals, model minorities). We have run several 
experiments to see whether “in-group love” was sufficient to explain moral exclusion and harm 
out-groups (in which case all out-groups should be treated equivalently) or whether our results 
were better explain by out-group hate (which should specifically target competitive out-groups). 
In one experiment, we used the famous Trolley Dilemma to investigate whether stereotypes 
motivated people to value some social groups’ lives over others (Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & 
Fiske, 2010). On each trial we assigned different stereotyped targets’ photos to the “sacrificed” 
and “saved” roles; we asked participants to indicate how morally acceptable it was for a third-
party named Joe to push one target (e.g., drug addict) off a bridge to save five others (e.g., five 
students). Not surprisingly, participants reported it was most acceptable to save cooperative, 
high-status groups (e.g., Americans and students). More importantly, participants did not value 
different kinds of out-group members’ lives equivalently. It was most morally acceptable to 
sacrifice, and least acceptable to save competitive, low-status (i.e., disgust) targets. Specifically, 
84% of our respondents said it was acceptable for Joe to push competitive, low-status targets 
off a bridge to save five cooperative, high-status targets. This finding is remarkable when 
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juxtaposed with the finding that 88% of people say this same act is unacceptable when the 
targets remain unidentified (Hauser et al., 2007). 
Critically, we have found participants’ endorsement of harm shifts to threatening out-
groups when the harm is not fatal. In one experiment we asked participants to imagine that they 
had to decide whether to assign one person to receive painful electric shocks in order to spare 
another four people. On each trial we assigned different stereotyped targets’ photos to the 
“scapegoat” role. This time, participants said it was most acceptable to harm competitive, high-
status targets (e.g., wealthy women, business men; Cikara & Fiske, 2011). Thus it appears in-
group love is not specific enough to predict which social groups will be targeted for aggression. 
Instead, the specific out-groups and their associated stereotypes matter.  
Banality of evil or virtuous violence? Participation in intergroup violence requires that 
people behave in ways that they would otherwise find aversive. The first several decades of 
social psychology were largely dedicated to understanding the circumstances that enable 
people to engage in antisocial behavior. For example, we know that harmful behavior is more 
likely to arise when individuals’ sense of personal responsibility is mitigated by obedience to 
authority (Milgram, 1965), anonymity (Diener, 1979; Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952), or 
diffusion/displacement of responsibility (Bandura, 1999) and when the salience of individuals’ 
own moral standards is low (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1989). While they are relevant, none of 
these explanations is unique to intergroup contexts. Even in the absence of an out-group, these 
circumstances could lead individuals in crowds to engage in immoral behavior (e.g., out of 
individual self-interest). More importantly, these explanations largely adhere to the “banality of 
evil” perspective (Arendt, 1976). By these accounts people are not actively choosing to act 
immorally so much as they are reflexively responding to the pressures exerted by the situation. 
An important alternative is that perpetrators of intergroup harm explicitly reframe and/or 
justify their behavior as serving a greater good (Pinter & Wildschut, 2010). For example, 
participants rate torture as more acceptable when their own versus other countries engage in it 
(Tarrant, Branscombe, Warner, & Weston, 2012). High identification and coordinated behavior 
with the in-group are critical conditions for acting on behalf of a group in general, and for 
intergroup aggression in particular (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008; Cikara & Paluck, 2013). As 
collective identities become “fused” with one’s individual identity, people may act as 
representatives of the group rather than as individual agents (Ellemers, 2012), allowing group 
goals to supplant individual goals. If the in-group’s goals require harming the out-group, people 
who are highly identified with the group may deliberately choose to endorse or do harm because 
they believe it is the right thing to do (A. P. Fiske & Rai; Reicher et al., 2008). Said another way, 
our moral codes may promote fairness and prohibition against harm in interpersonal contexts, 
but we bring different rules and expectations to bear on competitive intergroup interactions 
(Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006; Rhodes & Chalik, 2013). This is an important perspective 
because intergroup Schadenfreude may be one important cue people use to rationalize the 
acceptability of harming out-group members. A complete account of intergroup aggression 
would have to integrate the contributions of lower-level affective signals (absence of negative 
and/or presence of positive affect) as well as higher-order cognitions reflecting on those signals.  
 
Intergroup Schadenfreude as a motivator of intergroup aggression 
Though several conditions predict Schadenfreude (see Smith, Powell, Combs, & 
Schurtz, 2009 for a review) I focus on the effect of intergroup competition, here (Cikara & Fiske, 
2013). In order for Schadenfreude to qualify as an intergroup emotion, people must feel it on 
behalf of their group. However, people only appraise events from an intergroup perspective 
when they are highly identified with the in-group (Mackie, Davis, & E. R. Smith, 2000), therefore 
Schadenfreude should correlate with group identification. Consistent with this prediction, college 
basketball fans’ identification with their team predicted greater Schadenfreude in response to a 
rival player’s injury (Hoogland et al., 2014). In another study, hardcore soccer fans smiled more 
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intensely when they watched a rival soccer team miss a penalty kick relative to when they 
watched their favored team make a goal (Boecker, Likowski, Pauli, & Weyers, 2014). In both of 
these examples, rivals’ misfortunes are only cause for pleasure because fans identified strongly 
with their favored team. Of course, both of these studies focus on (a) groups with a history of 
rivalry and (b) Schadenfreude in response to events that are related to the basis for that rivalry 
(i.e., asking sports fans how they feel about sports-related outcomes). One open question is 
how much information is necessary to evoke intergroup Schadenfreude? Is a history of rivalry 
required? Does Schadenfreude extend to events that are irrelevant to the intergroup 
competition? One way to address these questions is to examine the minimal conditions under 
which participant exhibit intergroup Schadenfreude.  
In a series of recent experiments, we found that participants exhibited greater 
Schadenfreude (and Glückschmerz) toward competitive out-group relative to in-group members 
only minutes after being assigned to novel groups in competition for $1 (Cikara et al., 2014).  
In the first experiment, we assigned participants to novel groups—the Eagles or the Rattlers—
purportedly based on their personalities (in reality we randomly assigned them to teams). We 
also manipulated whether groups were competitive, cooperative, or independently working 
toward winning a $1 bonus. We told participants that we would award bonuses depending on 
participants’ and their team’s performance in an upcoming problem solving challenge. In the 
competitive condition, in which only one team could win the bonus, participants reported greater 
Schadenfreude toward out-group relative to in-group members, even though the misfortunes 
were irrelevant to the upcoming competition (e.g., “Brendan accidentally walked into a glass 
door.”). Intergroup Schadenfreude was attenuated when groups worked independently for the 
bonus and eliminated when groups were told they were going to work together to earn the 
bonus. We included unaffiliated targets as a baseline in a second experiment, including only the 
competitive condition. We found that participants responded to unaffiliated targets (people who 
did not fit the profile of either an Eagle or a Rattler) the same way they responded to in-group 
targets. These results indicate that rather than uniquely shielding the in-group from 
Schadenfreude, people reserve Schadenfreude only for competitive out-groups (Cikara et al., 
2014). It is worth noting that using novel groups has the added benefit of controlling for pre-
existing negative attitudes, resentment regarding the out-group’s past successes (Hareli and 
Weiner, 2002), and perceptions that past success was ill gotten (Feather and Sherman, 2002).  
These effects also emerge in more subtle social contexts. For example, we have found 
that people smile more when targets who are merely stereotyped as competitive (e.g., an 
investment banker) experience bad events (relative to good events; Cikara & Fiske, 2012). 
Together, these results indicate that a target can evoke these malicious emotional responses in 
the absence of any personal history or direct contact with the perceiver, due only to their group 
membership and its associated stereotypes. 
Thus, Schadenfreude appears to be a prepared or “natural” response in contexts that 
are or are perceived as zero-sum. If a threatening out-group is unhappy, “we” are pleased; no 
learning is required. Remember, however, that experiencing pleasure in response to the 
observation of out-group harm is very different from becoming the first person agent of harm. 
Given that group survival may require some members to harm out-groups on behalf of the in-
group, one intriguing possibility is that Schadenfreude motivates participation in intergroup 
aggression by teaching people to overcome the aversion to harming out-group members.  
Insights from cognitive neuroscience. Many regions of the brain are implicated in 
encoding and representing reward, but the ventral striatum (VS) is associated specifically with 
reinforcement learning. By many accounts, this region supports learning stimulus-value 
associations and acquiring predictive value representation in the service of guiding behavior 
(O’Doherty, 2004). In other words, this region supports learning from our experience so we can 
repeat behaviors that yield rewards. There are now several fMRI studies investigating 
Schadenfreude, all of which find that greater VS engagement is correlated with greater 
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Schadenfreude (e.g., Singer et al., 2006; Takahashi et al., 2009). This Schadenfreude/VS 
association generalizes to intergroup contexts. For example, baseball fans watching their 
favored team compete with a rival report pleasure and exhibit activity in VS when watching their 
own team do well and when watching rivals fail (even against a lower ranked team, the 
Baltimore Orioles; Cikara, Botvinick, & Fiske, 2011). These findings extend to contexts in which 
victims are merely associated with the rival team. soccer fans exhibited VS activity when 
watching a rival team’s fan receive a painful electric shock (Hein et al. 2010). In neither case are 
participants in direct competition. Instead, out-group failure and pain take on a positive value by 
virtue of participants’ affiliation with their favored team. 
These studies provide only correlational evidence but they suggest an intriguing 
possibility: that the capacity for intergroup aggression may have developed, in part, by 
appropriating basic reinforcement-learning processes and associated neural circuitry in order to 
overcome harm aversion. Again, these results are correlational, but greater VS response to a 
rival’s suffering in the context of the baseball and soccer studies described above predicted an 
increased desire to harm rival team fans (Cikara et al., 2011) and a decreased willingness to 
relieve a rival fan’s pain (by accepting a proportion of the pain for oneself; Hein et al., 2010). 
These data implicate both the VS’s valuation function—evaluating out-group harm as positive—
but also its motivation function—learning to select behaviors that harm the out-group and 
associated individuals. They also support the prediction that the pleasure/harm association 
generalizes to individuals merely associated with the teams under consideration.  
 
Implications and Future Directions 
It is critical to understand failures of empathy and Schadenfreude as they unfold 
between groups (as opposed to individuals) because intergroup contexts significantly increase 
opportunities for violence. First, harm can be justified as being morally necessary in the 
absence of any personal grievance (e.g., in defense of the in-group and its values; A. P. Fiske & 
Rai, 2014; Reicher et al., 2008). Second, the pleasure-pain association generalizes to entire 
groups; individuals who have done nothing to provoke violence become targets by virtue of their 
affiliation with a competitive, threatening out-group.  
One outstanding question is whether increased willingness to harm out-group members 
predicts increased identification with the in-group. For example, Littman (2015) finds that ex-
combatants in Uganda and Liberia who were abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) as 
youths and forced to harm loved ones on its behalf, are more highly identified with the LRA than 
abducted youths who were not forced to harm loved ones. One possibility is that the pleasure of 
doing out-group harm may further reinforce group identification, creating a self-perpetuating 
cycle of collective violence (Littman & Paluck, 2014). This is a somewhat provocative prediction 
because it runs counter to the prediction made by cognitive dissonance theory. On an over-
justification account (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999), decreased Schadenfreude and increased 
harm aversion would predict greater identification with the out-group, because participants have 
to overcome greater psychological barriers in order to do harm. Alternatively, the presence of 
positive affect in response to doing harm could also be a source of dissonance. We are 
presently running studies to adjudicate among these hypotheses. 
Finally, it would be irresponsible to refrain from reiterating that participation in intergroup 
aggression is a multiply determined phenomenon with many causes and consequences. 
Intergroup competition, group identification, and moral justifications are all motivators of 
intergroup aggression (at least in humans). However, linking out-group aggression to 
reinforcement-learning expands the reach of our research not only to other areas of scientific 
inquiry (e.g., behavioral neuroscience; cognitive neuroscience; economics; biology) and other 
model organisms (e.g., rodent and primate models), but also to political and educational 
institutions with the power to make and implement policy. Ultimately, a better understanding of 
all the mechanisms promoting intergroup aggression will inform best practices for defusing it. 
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Footnotes 
 
1This chapter is based on an article the author wrote for Current Opinion in Behavioral  
Science. 
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